China’s Global Belt & Road Infrastructure Drive Hits Record Highs

China’s Global Belt & Road Infrastructure Drive Hits Record Highs

China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is surging ahead at a pace not seen in its 12-year history. In the first half of 2025 alone, Chinese companies inked BRI construction contracts worth $66.2 billion and invested roughly $57.1 billion in projects across Asia, Africa, Europe and beyond, the highest six-month engagement ever recorded. This $124 billion burst of activity in H1 2025 eclipses the BRI’s entire investment total for all of 2024. From energy mega-deals in Nigeria to high-tech manufacturing in Kazakhstan, China’s global infrastructure drive has reached new heights, defying expectations that it might be slowing down.

Now spanning 150 countries (nearly three-quarters of the world), the BRI has evolved far beyond its origins. Launched in 2013 as President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy vision, the initiative was conceived to finance and build roads, railways, ports and power plants across the developing world, forging new “Silk Road” links and expanding China’s economic reach. Twelve years on, cumulative Chinese engagement under the BRI has topped $1.3 trillion, encompassing some 775 billion in construction work and $533 billion in direct investments across dozens of industries. It is a staggering scale of global development finance. Yet this growth has not come without challenges, from debt concerns to geopolitical pushback, prompting Beijing to recalibrate its strategy even as the money keeps flowing.

Surging Investments Defy Expectations

Industry analysts and policymakers alike have been surprised by the BRI’s renewed momentum in 2025. “The surge in Chinese engagement this year is surprising, even against the backdrop of steadily growing BRI activity since Covid,” observed Professor Christoph Nedopil, author of a new BRI investment report. “What sets 2025 apart is the scale: multiple megadeals each exceeding $10 billion.” Indeed, while China had signalled an intention to rein in the BRI’s pace and risk profile, the latest data tell a different story, one of bigger bets on strategic projects.

In late 2024, President Xi Jinping declared the BRI had entered a “new phase” emphasising “high-quality” and “small and beautiful” projects to mitigate financial risks for China and its partners. However, the record-smashing deals in early 2025 suggest small is not the defining trait of BRI’s evolution. “The BRI is evolving,” said Professor Nedopil. “We are seeing fewer, but much larger, projects focused on long-term strategic returns, particularly in critical minerals and clean technologies that will underpin future industries.” In other words, China appears to be doubling down on mega-projects that can secure vital resources and industrial footholds, even as it trims smaller, riskier ventures.

This shift in strategy is evidenced by a jump in average deal size. In 2025, the typical BRI investment deal (over $100 million) ballooned to about $1.24 billion, nearly double the average in 2024. Construction contracts likewise swelled to an average of $783 million. Several colossal agreements drove these figures, notably a single $20 billion contract to build a gas industrial park in Nigeria, and two multi‐billion dollar investments in Kazakhstan’s mining sector. Such outsized deals, often backed by natural resources, are propelling BRI engagement to record levels.

Energy, Mining and Tech Lead the Charge

Energy projects are at the heart of the BRI boom. In the first half of 2025, Chinese companies committed roughly $42-44 billion to energy-related ventures abroad, the most in any period since the initiative’s launch. About half of that went into oil and gas, including the massive Ogidigben Gas Revolution Industrial Park in Nigeria (a flagship $20 billion development) and a $1.6 billion gas-fired power plant deal in Saudi Arabia. By mid-2025, China’s overseas oil & gas engagements had already topped $30 billion, exceeding the total for all of 2024. This fossil-fuel push might seem at odds with global decarbonisation trends, but it reflects China’s drive to secure energy supplies and leverage its construction might in petroleum infrastructure.

At the same time, green energy is reaching new heights in the BRI. Investments in solar farms, wind parks, hydropower and waste-to-energy facilities hit $9.7 billion in H1 2025, a record for clean energy since 2013. These projects promise to add nearly 12 gigawatts of renewable generation capacity across BRI countries. For example, Chinese firms are building large wind farms in Central Asia and solar plants in the Middle East, while also venturing into newer areas like battery storage and hydrogen. “China’s record BRI engagement in 2025 reflects a renewed push into critical sectors such as energy, mining and high-tech manufacturing,” Professor Nedopil noted. “What we’re seeing is China leveraging its industrial strengths to secure future competitiveness and supply chain resilience in a shifting global economy.” In short, energy, both fossil and renewable, remains the bedrock of the BRI, accounting for about 35% of all Belt and Road expenditures this year.

Closely intertwined with energy is the boom in metals and mining. Chinese overseas engagement in mining projects soared to $24.9 billion in the first half of 2025, more than was spent in any full year prior. Much of this is targeted at strategic minerals needed for industry and clean tech. In resource-rich Central Asia, for instance, Chinese investors poured around $12 billion into aluminium production and $7.5 billion into copper development in Kazakhstan. These ventures include not just extraction but also processing facilities like smelters, indicating a push to integrate more of the supply chain in partner countries. By value, roughly 60% of China’s mining-related outlays went into downstream processing and refining, while 40% supported raw mineral extraction. This focus on minerals reflects China’s quest for materials like bauxite, copper, lithium and cobalt, which are essential for everything from electric vehicles to power grids, industries Beijing deems critical for the future.

Meanwhile, technology and manufacturing have emerged as breakout sectors in the BRI’s new chapter. High-tech and industrial projects attracted over $23 billion in Chinese investment across BRI countries in early 2025, double the amount a year before. Chinese companies are financing electric vehicle and battery factories, solar panel manufacturing, telecom and data infrastructure, and even ventures into emerging areas like green hydrogen. For example, Shenzhen-based BYD and CATL are expanding EV battery production overseas, and Longi Green Energy, a major solar equipment maker, is helping develop a green hydrogen project in Nigeria. In Europe, another BRI partner region, China’s CALB is investing $2.1 billion in a lithium battery plant in Portugal, while Xinyi Glass is putting $700 million into a solar panel glass factory in Egypt. These projects illustrate how the BRI is no longer just about bridges and ports, it’s also about cutting-edge manufacturing and technology transfer. By bolstering industrial capacity abroad, Chinese firms aim to create new markets for their products and secure supply chains for advanced industries.

Africa and Central Asia on Top

China’s overseas infrastructure push now truly spans the globe, but not all regions are equal beneficiaries. In the first half of 2025, Africa emerged as the top destination for BRI financing, as Chinese contracts and investments there rocketed to roughly $39 billion. That is nearly five times the African total from the same period a year earlier. Flagship deals in Africa include Nigeria’s gas mega-project and several major transport and power projects across East and West Africa. For example, China Railway and partners are extending Tanzania’s standard-gauge railway network with multi-billion dollar contracts, and Chinese firms are involved in new port and highway projects from Kenya to Côte d’Ivoire. African leaders, who have long courted infrastructure investment, welcome this surge. “China has a special place… to enhance the competitiveness of Africa,” Kenyan President William Ruto remarked at the BRI Forum in Beijing, emphasizing that Chinese-funded projects are helping to modernise the continent’s economies. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed echoed that sentiment, noting that “China continues to be a critical partner for Ethiopia.” These endorsements underscore how BRI projects, from railways in Kenya to industrial parks in Ethiopia, are viewed as transformative opportunities across Africa.

Central Asia was the second-biggest BRI magnet in early 2025, drawing around $25 billion in Chinese engagement. This landlocked region, comprising former Soviet republics, has become a focal point of Beijing’s Eurasian infrastructure vision. Kazakhstan in particular saw an influx of Chinese capital, including the enormous mining investments in aluminium and copper mentioned earlier, as well as expansions in oil/gas processing and renewables. The Kazakh government has actively supported BRI projects as part of its development plans, partnering with Chinese firms to build everything from highways to logistics hubs along the new Silk Road routes. Elsewhere in Central Asia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are benefiting from Chinese-built transport corridors and energy facilities. By investing heavily in its Central Asian neighbours, China is not only securing resources but also weaving a tighter economic fabric across the heart of Asia, a region traditionally within Russia’s sphere of influence.

Other regions saw mixed outcomes. Middle Eastern BRI partners secured about $19 billion in Chinese deals, notably large oil, gas and petrochemical projects in Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In Southeast Asia, which has been a BRI hotspot for years, Chinese investment was a more modest $11.3 billion, reflecting a plateau as some big projects (like Indonesia’s high-speed railway) near completion. Europe, surprisingly, recorded a sharp uptick in Chinese BRI engagement in early 2025, albeit from a low base, with about $3.5 billion invested. Most of that was due to a few high-tech manufacturing deals (such as the Portuguese battery plant) in friendly European states. In contrast, Latin America remained a minor player in the BRI, with Chinese involvement there at its lowest level in a decade. Major Latin economies like Brazil and Mexico have been cautious about BRI, and that wariness shows in the limited new deals.

The geographic distribution of BRI spending can shift quickly with a few big deals. For instance, Nigeria alone accounted for over $21 billion in construction contracts signed in 2025 H1, skyrocketing from virtually nothing the year before. Other top recipient countries in this period were Saudi Arabia ($7.2 billion), the UAE ($7 billion), Tanzania ($3.6 billion) and Indonesia ($2.1 billion) for construction; and Kazakhstan ($23 billion), Thailand ($7.4 billion) and Egypt ($4.8 billion) for investments. On the flip side, at least 16 BRI countries saw no new deals at all in early 2025. Notably, China’s famously flagship partner Pakistan, home to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, experienced a 54% drop in BRI activity compared to the previous year. This decline follows several years of slowdown in CPEC projects amid Pakistan’s economic troubles. Also telling is that Russia received zero new BRI investments or contracts in H1 2025, as Western sanctions and the Ukraine conflict have effectively frozen major new Chinese ventures there. These shifts highlight how China is recalibrating its partnerships, concentrating on locales that offer stability, resources or strategic value, while cooling on higher-risk destinations.

Private Players and State Giants

Another notable trend in the BRI’s current phase is who is footing the bill. While Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy banks dominated the initiative’s early years, private-sector companies are now taking a lead role in many investments. In the first half of 2025, the top Chinese investors in BRI projects were East Hope Group and Xinfa Group, both privately owned industrial conglomerates, followed by solar titan Longi Green Energy and tech giant ByteDance. These firms together poured billions into overseas manufacturing plants, mining ventures and digital infrastructure. Their prominence marks a shift toward market-driven investment, as private companies seek growth abroad amid a slowing domestic economy. By contrast, among construction contracts (which often rely on Chinese state-bank loans), state-owned enterprises still reign supreme. China National Chemical Engineering Group and PowerChina were among the biggest contractors building BRI projects in 2025, from Nigerian gas facilities to African railways.

This evolving mix of players may make the BRI more resilient and diversified. Private investors tend to pursue projects with clearer commercial returns, which could mean more sustainable deals. Beijing has openly encouraged more private-sector involvement, partly to reduce the financial burden on state lenders and to inject business rigor into BRI ventures. The strategy seems to be paying off: nearly half of China’s BRI engagement by value in 2025 H1 came as equity investment (not just loan-funded construction), one of the highest investment shares on record. However, it’s worth noting that many of the “big ticket” deals driving the latest surge are resource-backed or profit-oriented, which arguably carry lower risk of default for Chinese stakeholders. In essence, Chinese companies, both state and private, are picking their overseas projects more selectively, favoring those that can deliver returns (oil revenue, mineral outputs, industrial profits) rather than purely public infrastructure that relies on host government repayment.

Balancing Development and Debt

As the BRI expands, it continues to grapple with questions about debt sustainability and local impact. Over a decade of large-scale lending has left China as the biggest creditor to several developing nations, and some have struggled under the weight of those loans. Countries from Sri Lanka to Zambia have faced debt crises partly linked to infrastructure projects, forcing Beijing into the unfamiliar role of negotiating debt relief and refinancing. In response, Chinese officials have talked up a turn toward “small and beautiful” projects and stronger risk controls. The evidence on the ground is mixed. On one hand, no new coal-fired power plants were agreed under the BRI since China pledged in 2021 to stop funding overseas coal power, a win for sustainability. Green investments are rising, and projects like schools, hospitals, and clean water facilities (aligned with global development goals) are occasionally cited as part of a more people-centred BRI. On the other hand, China in 2025 still backed over $1.5 billion in coal mining and related infrastructure abroad, and oil and gas deals hit record highs. This underscores a pragmatic balancing act between climate commitments and immediate energy/economic needs.

Some partner governments have become more cautious too. Malaysia, for example, renegotiated BRI rail projects to cut costs; and Italy, the only G7 country to have joined the BRI, decided to withdraw from the initiative in late 2023, citing concerns that the benefits did not outweigh the risks. (Italy’s exit, along with Panama’s, brings the official BRI membership down to 150 countries.) Such developments have prodded China to adjust its approach, emphasizing “high-quality, sustainable” cooperation in official rhetoric. Moving forward, experts say BRI projects will likely undergo more rigorous feasibility checks, and China may offer more grant funding or local partnerships to soften debt burdens. “Years of massive overseas lending brought China to an unfamiliar role of being a major creditor to many of its BRI partners struggling with debt,” noted one analysis, explaining that Beijing has had to provide bailouts and rethink how it finances development. In essence, the BRI’s challenge is to prove it can deliver “win-win” development, building essential infrastructure and industries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, without tipping countries into financial distress or political dependency.

The Road Ahead

Despite global economic headwinds, China shows no sign of hitting the brakes on the Belt and Road Initiative. If anything, Beijing is recalibrating for a more sustainable but still robust BRI 2.0. Officials speak of focusing on what they call the “New Three” industries, electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable energy, as pillars of cooperation going forward. This dovetails with the data, which already indicate strong engagement in EV manufacturing, battery supply chains, and green power projects in BRI countries. We can expect more Chinese-built battery factories, solar farms, and EV assembly plants sprouting up across partner nations, given the dual benefits of economic development and climate action.

Infrastructure will remain a core theme, but possibly with a tilt toward “smarter” projects. Future BRI deals are likely to feature digital and ICT infrastructure (data centres, telecommunications networks), logistics hubs and railways that boost trade connectivity, and resource-backed projects that secure commodities for China while generating revenue for host countries. High-visibility endeavours, such as modern ports, mega-dams, or transnational rail lines, will continue where they align with strategic interests, but they will be accompanied by smaller-scale initiatives aiming to directly improve livelihoods. Crucially, China is also working through institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank to co-finance projects, potentially spreading risk and adhering to international standards in areas like procurement and environmental impact.

Geopolitical rivalry could also shape the BRI’s next chapter. As the U.S. and EU roll out their own infrastructure investment plans for developing regions (albeit at much smaller scale so far), recipient countries might have alternative options. This competition could push China to enhance the BRI’s appeal, for instance, by offering more favourable loan terms or emphasizing partnerships in advanced industries. Chinese Premier Li Qiang recently urged the AIIB to increase its support for BRI ventures, signalling that China wants to mobilize even more funding through multilateral avenues. At the same time, global trade uncertainties and supply chain shifts (exacerbated by tariffs and tech disputes) are actually spurring Chinese companies to invest more overseas as they seek new markets and production bases. In this sense, the BRI is also a tool for China’s own economic adaptation, helping its firms go global when facing pressures at home.

As 2025 progresses, many observers predict a stabilisation of BRI activity at these high levels rather than continued exponential growth. The second half of the year may see fewer headline-grabbing “megadeals”, but a greater number of mid-sized projects spreading across more countries. The broad trend is clear: the Belt and Road Initiative is entering its second decade with a renewed vigour, bigger in scale and broader in scope than ever. From African highways to Central Asian mines, from Middle Eastern power plants to European tech parks, the BRI’s imprint on global infrastructure is deepening. With careful stewardship to address debt and sustainability concerns, this expansive initiative could very well pave the way for a new era of interconnected growth across the developing world, truly living up to its name of a belt binding continents together and a road leading to shared prosperity.